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The Impact of Border Carbon Adjustments under Alternative Producer Responses 
Niven Winchester*
,† 
Abstract 
Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) have been proposed to address leakage and competitiveness 
concerns. In traditional assessments, firms regard BCAs as output taxes rather than implicit 
emissions taxes. Using a stylized energy-economic model, we analyze the impact of BCAs for 
alternative producer responses. When firms view BCAs as an implicit emissions tax, the outcome 
depends on whether or not firms can differentiate production across destination markets. If firms 
are able to produce a low-emissions variety for regions imposing BCAs, results are similar to 
when firms regard BCAs as an output tax. If firms produce a single variety for all markets, BCAs 
result in larger leakage reductions than in standard approaches. We also find that BCAs are less 
effective at addressing competitive concerns in scenarios that result in larger leakage 
reductions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) restrictions implemented by some nations can increase 
emissions in nations without climate policies. Leakage of emissions can occur via at least 
two channels. First, climate policies reduce fossil fuel prices which result in increased 
energy consumption in countries without restrictions. Second, energy-intensive 
production can relocate from countries with GHG restrictions to countries without 
restrictions. The second form of leakage highlights competitiveness issues that arise when 
a subset of nations restricts emissions. 
Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) – tariffs on emissions embodied in imports from 
nations without emissions restrictions – have been proposed to address leakage and 
competitiveness concerns. In the U.S., the House of Representatives recently passed the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), commonly known as the 
Waxman-Markey Bill (U.S. Congress 2009). In addition to outlining emissions 
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restrictions, H.R. 2454 details charges on emissions embodied in imports. In general, 
BCA provisions in the bill target energy-intensive imports from countries that do not 
have economy-wide GHG reduction programs at least as stringent as in the U.S. An 
important feature of BCAs yet to be detailed is how embodied emissions will be 
calculated. For example, H.R. 2454 requires that “a general methodology” is established 
to determine emissions embodied in imports (U.S. Congress, 2009, p.1123). 
In economic analyses of BCAs (Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Babiker and Rutherford, 
2005; Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Ponssard and Walker, 2008; Mattoo et al., 2009; 
Burniaux, et al., 2010; Winchester et al., 2011), producers in nations without emissions 
restrictions regard BCAs as an output tax on goods shipped to countries with climate 
policies. An alternative assumption is that exporting firms view BCAs as an implicit tax 
on GHG emissions. In this regard, producer responses to BCAs will depend on embodied 
emissions legislation. If embodied emissions calculations are never or rarely updated, 
firms will view BCAs as a tax on exports. If embodied emissions calculations are 
frequently updated, producers will regard BCAs as an emissions tax and respond to 
BCAs by reducing the GHG intensity of production. In this situation, producer responses 
will further be influenced by the degree to which producers can operate separate 
production lines for different markets (and produce a low-GHG variety for some 
markets). This paper contributes to the BCA literature by examining the impact of BCAs 
for alternative firm responses to embodied emissions charges. 
This paper has four further sections. Section 2 outlines our methodology and describes 
the scenarios we considered. Our results are presented and discussed in Section 3. The 
sensitivity of our results to key assumptions is examined in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Modeling Framework 
Our analysis employs a stylized energy-economic model, similar to the GTAP-EG 
model described by Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). The model is a static, multi-regional 
model of the global economy that determines the production and allocations of goods. 
The model identifies two regions. One region (the Coalition) implements climate policies 
and the other region (the non-Coalition) does not. The model also distinguishes five 
energy sectors (Coal, Crude oil, Refined oil, Gas, and Electricity), two other sectors 
(Energy-intensive industry, EINT; and Other industry, OTHR), and five primary factors 
(capital, labor, coal resources, crude oil resources, and gas resources). 
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Figure 1. Nesting structures for (a) Crude oil, Coal and Gas; (b) Energy-intensive industry and Other industry; (c) 
Electricity; and (d) Consumption. 
Note: Vertical lines signify a Leontief structure where the elasticity of substitution is zero. σGR = 0.6, σK-L = 1, σE-KL = 0.5, σENG = 0.5, σFE = 1, σCN = 
0.25 and σENE-FD = 0.5.
(a) (b) 
(d) (c) 
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Production technologies are represented by multi-level nests of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) functions. Production structures are outlined in panels (a), (b) and (c) 
of Figure 1. Fossil fuel commodities are produced by a CES aggregate of a sector-
specific resource and a composite of capital, labor and intermediate inputs. Important 
production features in other sectors include substitution between energy commodities, 
and substitution between aggregate energy and a capital-labor composite. Values 
assigned to elasticity parameters are detailed in the notes to Figure 1. Elasticity values 
closely follow those used in the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) 
model (Paltsev et al., 2005), which are drawn from an extensive literature review. 
Marginal abatement costs in the model are influenced by elasticities of substitution 
among commodities. Implied marginal abatement costs are increasing, convex functions 
of the quantity of emissions abated. 
In each region, a representative agent derives income from factor income, tax revenue 
and an exogenous international net transfer (reflecting current account imbalances in the 
base period). Preferences are represented by nested CES functions, as outlined in panel 
(d) of Figure 1. Consumption elasticity values also follow Paltsev et al. (2005) and are 
detailed in the notes for Figure 1. The specification allows greater substitution among 
energy commodities than among non-energy commodities. 
Goods are traded internationally following an Armington approach. Imports by region 
of origin are aggregated using a CES function (as each region is an aggregate of many 
countries, each region imports from itself as well as the other region), and composite 
imports are combined with domestic production using an additional CES aggregator. 
Thus, goods purchased by firms and households are composites of domestic and imported 
varieties. Based on estimates from Hertel et al. (2007), the elasticity of substitution 
between imports from different regions is around 3 and the elasticity of substitution 
between composite imports and domestic production is around 6 for all products, except 
Gas and Crude oil. The corresponding elasticities for these commodities are around 15 
and 35, reflecting less heterogeneity across varieties for Crude oil and Gas than for other 
products. A drawback of this treatment of trade flows is that, as demonstrated by Brown 
(1987), tariff changes can result in considerable terms-of-trade effects when goods are 
differentiated by country of origin. 
Turning to closure, factor prices are endogenous, there is full employment, factors are 
immobile internationally, capital and labor are mobile across sectors, and each region 
maintains a constant current account surplus. 
The model is calibrated using version 7.1 of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). The GTAP database includes 
economic data and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels 
for 113 regions and 57 sectors corresponding to 2004. In our model, the Coalition 
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includes Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, the U.S., the EU 27, and the European 
Free Trade Association. Remaining regions form the non-Coalition. Energy-intensive 
industry includes paper products and publishing; ferrous metals (iron and steel); other 
metals; metal products; chemical, rubber and plastic products; and other mineral products 
(non-metallic minerals). Turning to energy sectors, the gas sector in our model is an 
aggregate of GTAP gas extraction and gas distribution sectors, and there is a one-to-one 
mapping between other energy sectors in our model and GTAP energy sectors. 
Remaining GTAP sectors are included in Other industry. 
2.2 Embodied Emissions Calculations 
As noted above, policy discussions do not detail how GHG emissions embodied in 
traded goods will be calculated. Our embodied emissions calculations consider CO2 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. For each sector, we calculate embodied 
emissions as CO2 emissions from direct fossil fuel use, plus CO2 emissions from 
Electricity production used by that sector. An alternative method, following Rutherford 
and Babiker (1997), is to calculate embodied emissions as the sum of direct emissions 
(emissions from the combustion of fossil) and indirect emissions (emissions embodied in 
intermediate inputs). However, this method may be difficult to put into practice, as it 
requires detailed emissions input-output accounting. 
2.3 Scenarios 
We consider the impact of BCAs in 2020. We create a reference for this year by 
assuming capital and labor endowments grow at an annual rate of 2.5% in the Coalition 
and 7% in the non-Coalition.  We also assume that there are annual autonomous energy 
efficiency improvements of 1% in the Coalition. Six climate policy scenarios are 
considered. In our first scenario (CAT-1), a cap-and-trade policy restricts Coalition 2020 
emissions to 80% of 2004 emissions. Four scenarios consider BCAs under alternative 
producer responses to BCAs, in addition to the emissions constraint in the CAT-1 
scenario. When firms regard BCAs as an output tax, the ad valorem tariff (τ) is selected 
so as to retrospectively apply the coalition CO2 price (pc) to emission embodied in non-
Coalition Energy-intensive production (xN). That is, τ = (pcxN)/peN, where peN is the price 
of Energy-intensive production in the non-Coalition. 
When firms view BCAs as an output tax, we implement separate scenarios for 
exogenous and endogenous embodied emissions calculations. In one scenario (TRF-
EXG), embodied emissions are calculated exogenously using the reference data, as is 
standard in the BCA literature. In another scenario (TRF-END), embodied emissions are 
calculated endogenously to account for the effect of BCAs on energy prices and 
ultimately energy use. Our TRF-END scenario mimics a case where embodied emissions 
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calculations are regularly updated, but firms do not realize that they can reduce BCA 
charges by reducing emissions. 
In two other BCA scenarios (TAX-DIF and TAX-AGR), firms view BCAs as an 
implicit tax on CO2 emissions. Under this assumption, a key question is the extent to 
which non-Coalition firms can use different production lines for goods shipped to 
different markets. We consider two cases. In our TAX-DIF scenario, non-Coalition firms 
use the same technology for all production lines, but can use different factor employment 
shares when producing for each market. In this case, BCAs (with endogenous embodied 
emissions calculations) effectively apply the Coalition CO2 price to emissions from non-
Coalition export production. As such, in response to BCAs, firms are able to substitute 
among energy commodities (including Electricity) and between aggregate energy and 
other inputs. In our analysis, implied emissions charges on direct fossil fuel use are 
directly related to CO2 emissions from each fuel, and we calculate the BCA-implicit 
charge on Electricity use based on emissions embodied in Electricity. As such, BCAs do 
not influence the composition of fossil fuel use in Electricity generation. An alternative 
assumption is that Energy-intensive producers are able to influence electricity generation 
choices. In this situation, BCAs would directly influence Electricity generation choices. 
We do not consider this alternative. 
Non-Coalition firms use one (aggregate) production line for goods shipped to all 
markets in our TAX-AGR scenario. Under this assumption, BCAs effectively apply a 
carbon price equal to αpc (where α is the share of non-Coalition Energy-intensive 
production exported to the Coalition) to emissions from non-Coalition Energy-intensive 
production. Embodied emissions calculations and α are determined endogenously in our 
TAX-AGR scenario. Like in our TAX-DIF scenario, the BCA-implicit charge on 
Electricity use is based on emissions embodied in Electricity. 
Our final scenario (CAT-2) implements a non-Coalition cap-and-trade policy that 
includes all sectors (in addition to a Coalition cap-and-trade policy). The non-Coalition 
emissions cap is set so as to eliminate leakage. Although it is unlikely that such a policy 
will be implemented by the non-Coalition in the near future, this scenario provides a 
useful yardstick for our BCA simulations. In the CAT-2 scenario, the non-Coalition is 
able to take advantage of cheap abatement options in all sectors, not just those in Energy-
intensive industry.  
3. RESULTS 
Table 1 presents welfare changes (without accounting for climate benefits from 
reduced GHG emissions), CO2 prices, output changes and leakage rates for each scenario. 
Welfare changes, measured as annual equivalent variation incomes changes, and output 
changes are expressed as proportional changes relative to our 2020 reference. In the 
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CAT-1 scenario, an emissions price of $112 per metric ton of CO2 (tCO2) is required to 
reduce emissions to 20% below 2004 levels. The emissions constraint reduces welfare by 
0.59% in the Coalition and 0.19% in the non-Coalition. Energy-intensive output 
decreases by 4% in the Coalition and increases by 7% in the non-Coalition. The leakage 
rate indicates that non-Coalition CO2 emissions increase by 25 tons for every 100 tons of 
CO2 abated in the Coalition. 
Table 1. Welfare, CO2 prices, Output and Leakage. 
 CAT-1 TRF-EXG TRF-END TAX-DIF TAX-AGR CAT-2 
Welfare change relative to reference (EV, %):     
Coalition -0.59 -0.48 -0.47 -0.52 -0.40 -0.59 
Non-
Coalition 
-0.19 -0.50 -0.52 -0.41 -0.57 -0.22 
Global -0.44 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.46 -0.45 
CO2 price (2004$/tCO2): 
Coalition 112.33 115.59 115.80 114.67 113.76 113.09 
Non-
Coalition 
- - - - - 2.36 
Energy-intensive output change relative to reference (%): 
Coalition -4.1 1.1 1.5 -0.4 -3.2 -3.8 
Non-
Coalition 
7.4 -3.8 -4.6 -0.8 4.7 6.4 
Leakage (%):      
Global 24.8 16.3 15.7 15.1 5.1 0.0 
In the TRF-EXG scenario, based on reference embodied emissions, the Coalition 
imposes a 12.5% tariff on Energy-intensive imports from the non-Coalition. The increase 
in Coalition welfare and decrease in non-Coalition welfare in this scenario, relative to the 
CAT-1 scenario, is driven by a large movement in the terms-of-trade in favor of the 
Coalition. As the tariff encourages Energy-intensive production in the Coalition, the 
Coalition emissions price increases to $116/tCO2. Relative to the reference scenario, the 
tariff induces a 1% increase in Energy-intensive output in the Coalition and a 3% 
decrease in the non-Coalition. As a result, leakage decreases to 16% (from 25% in the 
CAT-1 scenario). The tariff on Energy-intensive imports in our TRF-END scenario 
(13.5%) is similar to that in the TRF-EXG scenario, as carbon tariffs cause only a small 
decrease in non-Coalition energy prices. Consequently, results are similar across the two 
tariff scenarios. 
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Firms view the carbon tariff as a CO2 tax and operate a separate production line for 
goods shipped to the Coalition in our TAX-DIF scenario. Under these assumptions, non-
Coalition producers reduce the CO2 intensity of exports, in addition to reducing exports 
to the Coalition. As a result, there is a small reduction in the leakage rate in the TAX-DIF 
scenario relative to the two tariff scenarios. Also relative to our tariff scenarios, Coalition 
welfare deteriorates and non-Coalition welfare improves, as terms-of-trade movements 
are smaller in the TAX-DIF scenarios than in the tariff scenarios. 
The lowest BCA leakage rate (5.1%) is observed for the TAX-AGR scenario. In this 
scenario, as noted above, αpc is effectively applied to non-Coalition Energy intensive 
production for all markets. The lower leakage rate for TAX-AGR compared to TAX-DIF 
is driven by the convexity of implied marginal abatement cost functions. To see this, let 
f(A) denote marginal abatement cost as a function of the quantity of emissions abated per 
unit of Energy-intensive output, where f’(A) > 0 and f’’(A) > 0. It follows that g’(pc) > 0 
and g’’(pc) < 0, where g = f -1.  The quantity of emission abated in the TAX-DIF scenario, 
A
DIF
, is g(pc)yC, where yNC is the quantity of non-Coalition Energy intensive exports 
shipped to the Coalition. The quantity of emissions abated in the TAX-AGR scenario, 
A
AGR
, is g(αpc)(yNC + yNN), where yNN is the quantity of non-Coalition Energy-intensive 
production sold in the non-Coalition. Noting that α = yNC/(yNC + yNN), A
AGR
 =  g(αpc)yC. 
From g’(pc) > 0 and g’’(pc) < 0, it follows that g(α) > αg(1) + (1- α)g(0). Further noting 
that g(0) = 0 (i.e., if the emissions price is zero, abatement will also be zero) yields A
AGR
 
=  g(αpc)yC > A
DIF
 = g(pc)yC. Put simply, when marginal abatement cost curves are 
convex, a small carbon price applied to multiple processes induces a larger decrease in 
emissions than a large carbon price applied to a single process. 
Non-Coalition welfare is lower in the TAX-AGR scenario than in the TAX-DIF 
simulation, as the TAX-AGR scenario places an additional constraint on non-Coalition 
producers. Conversely, Coalition welfare is higher in the TAX-AGR scenario than under 
the TAX-DIF assumptions, as Coalition exports to the non-Coalition increase. Although 
the reduction in leakage is largest in the TAX-AGR scenario, this scenario also results in 
the lowest level of Energy-intensive industry production in the Coalition across all BCA 
scenarios. 
In our final scenario, CAT-2, a non-Coalition emissions price of $2/tCO2 is required to 
eliminate leakage, and there are only small changes in welfare and Energy-intensive 
output compared to the CAT-1 scenario. These results reflect the fact that leakage is a 
very small proportion of global emissions – in the CAT-1 scenario, leakage to the 
Coalition represents 2% of global emissions. Consequently, while BCAs can significantly 
reduce leakage they have a minor impact on global emissions, and leakage can be 
eliminated by modest non-coalition mitigation measures. 
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4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Key parameters in our analysis include elasticities of substitution in the Armington 
specification. We examine the sensitivity of our results to these parameters by 
multiplying Armington elasticities by 0.5 and 2 (except Armington elasticities for Crude 
oil and Gas). We also report results when the Armington multiplier is 1, to facilitate 
comparison with our base results. Leakage rates for alternative Armington multipliers are 
presented in Figure 2. Larger Armington elasticities result in larger leakage rates, as 
Coalition climate policy induces a larger shift in demand toward non-Coalition 
production when substitution possibilities are greater. For all elasticity specifications, the 
leakage rate is lowest in the TAX-AGR scenario, and the leakage rate is negative in this 
scenario when the Armington multiplier is 0.5. 
 
Figure 2. Leakage rates for alternative Armington elasticity multipliers (%). 
Welfare changes for alternative Armington elasticities (which are not reported in 
Figure 2), indicated that, in general, larger Armington elasticities decrease Coalition 
welfare and increase non-Coalition welfare. These results are driven by terms-of-trade 
movements that favor the Coalition, which are a decreasing function of Armington 
elasticity values. In all Armington specifications, as in our base scenarios, global welfare 
is higher in the TAX-AGR scenario than in other BCA scenarios, but global welfare is 
highest in the CAT-2 simulation. In general, the ordering of scenarios in terms of leakage 
and welfare costs is unaffected by alternative Armington elasticity values. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Leakage and competitiveness concerns arising from climate policies implemented by a 
subset of nations have been the source of a considerable political debate. BCAs have 
emerged as a likely remedial measure. However, despite discussion of BCAs in policy 
circles, details concerning the operation of BCAs are vague. 
An important feature of BCAs is the calculation of emissions embodied in imports, 
and how firms might respond to BCAs. We assumed that embodied emissions were 
calculated as the sum of direct emissions and indirect emissions from electricity, and 
considered the impact of BCAs on energy-intensive imports under alternative responses 
by non-Coalition firms. Our analysis showed that the impact of BCAs on leakage and 
production varied significantly for different assumptions. When firms viewed BCAs as an 
emission tax and operated a separate production line for each market, BCAs reduced 
leakage by about one-third. When non-Coalition firms operated a single production line 
for all markets, firms utilized low-cost abatement options in all Energy-intensive 
production and leakage fell by 80%. 
Simulations that generated the lowest leakage rates also resulted in the lowest increase 
in Coalition energy-intensive production, relative to a scenario with a Coalition cap-and-
trade policy without BCAs. As the response of non-Coalition producers to BCAs will be 
influenced by embodied emissions legislation, these results indicate that policymakers 
face a tradeoff between leakage and competitiveness concerns. To the extent that terms-
of-trade changes simulated in our model are plausible, the results also suggest the 
specifics of BCA legislation will have a large influence on welfare impacts. 
We also considered a case where leakage was eliminated by a cap-and-trade policy in 
the Coalition. As leakage from the Coalition to the non-Coalition represents a small 
proportion of global emissions, the CO2 price in this scenario was around $2/tCO2. This 
result indicates that leakage could be eliminated by modest emissions mitigation 
measures by the non-Coalition. As near-term emissions constraints in the non-Coalition 
are unlikely, modest efficiency improvements in this region may be a more practical way 
to offset leakage. A global agreement binding the non-Coalition to such measures would 
encourage non-Coalition producers to take advantage of low-cost mitigation options in all 
sectors, and avoid inefficiencies associated with border measures. In this regard, BCAs 
may serve as a coercion device in global climate policy negotiations. 
A caveat to our analysis is that we did not consider legal issues surrounding BCAs. 
The consensus in the literature examining the legality of BCAs is that tariffs on embodied 
emissions may be permissible under World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions for 
border tax adjustments (Goh, 2004; Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007; Ismer and Neuhoff 
200; Green and Epps, 2008). However, as a BCA complaint has yet to be lodged with the 
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WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, the legality of alternative embodied emissions 
regulations is unclear. 
Acknowledgements 
The Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is funded by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Science under grants DE-FG02-94ER61937, DE-FG02- 
93ER61677, DE-FG02-08ER64597, and DE-FG02-06ER64320; the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency under grants XA-83344601-0, XA-83240101, XA-83042801-0, PI-
83412601- 0, RD-83096001, and RD-83427901-0; the U.S. National Science Foundation 
under grants SES- 0825915, EFRI-0835414, ATM-0120468, BCS-0410344, ATM-
0329759, and DMS-0426845; the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
under grants NNX07AI49G, NNX08AY59A, NNX06AC30A, NNX09AK26G, 
NNX08AL73G, NNX09AI26G, NNG04GJ80G, NNG04GP30G, and NNA06CN09A; 
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under grants DG1330-05-
CN-1308, NA070AR4310050, and NA16GP2290; the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration under grant 06-C-NE-MIT; the Electric Power Research Institute under 
grant EP-P32616/C15124; and a consortium of 40 industrial and foundation sponsors (for 
complete list see http://globalchange.mit.edu/sponsors/current.html). 
6. REFERENCES 
Babiker, M.H. and T.F. Rutherford, 2005: The economic effects of border measures in 
subglobal climate agreements. The Energy J., 26(4): 99-125.  
Bhagwati, J. and P.C. Mavroidis, 2007: Is action against U.S. exports for failure to sign 
the Kyoto Protocol WTO legal? World Trade Review, 6: 299–310. 
Brown, D., 1987: Tariffs, the terms of trade, and national product differentiation. J. of 
Policy Modeling, 9(3): 503-26. 
Burniaux, J-M, J. Château, and R. Duval, 2010: Is there a case for carbon-based border 
tax adjustments? An applied general equilibrium analysis. Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 794, OECD. 
Demailly, D. and P. Quirion, 2008: European Emissions Trading Scheme and 
competitiveness: A case study on the iron and steel industry. Energy Economics, 
30(4): 2009-27. 
Felder, S. and T.F. Rutherford, 1993: Unilateral CO2 reduction and carbon leakage. J. of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 25(2): 163-176. 
Goh, G., 2004: The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and energy tax adjustments at the 
border. J. of World Trade, 38(3): 395–423. 
Green, A. and T. Epps, 2008: Is there a role for trade measures in addressing climate 
change? UC Davis J. of International Law and Policy, 15(1): 1-31. 
12 
 
Hertel, T., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic and R. Keeney, 2007: How confident can we be of 
CGE-based assessments of free trade agreements? Economic Modelling, 24(4):611-
635. 
Ismer, R. and K. Neuhoff, 2007: Border tax adjustment: A feasible way to support 
stringent emissions trading. European Journal of Law and Economics, 24(2): 137-
164. 
Mattoo, A., A. Subramanian, D. van der Mensbrugghe and J. He, 2009: Reconciling 
climate change and policy, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 
5123. 
Narayanan, B.G. and T.L. Walmsley, (eds.) 2008: Global Trade, Assistance, and 
Production: The GTAP 7 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue 
University. 
Paltsev, S., J. Reilly, H.D. Jacoby, R.S. Eckaus, J. McFarland, M. Sarofim, M. Asadooria 
and M. Babiker, 2005: The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) 
model: Version 4. MIT JPSPGC Report No. 125, August, 72 p. 
(http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt125.pdf) 
Ponssard, J-P. and N. Walker, 2008: EU emissions trading and the cement sector: A 
spatial competition analysis. Climate Policy, 8(5): 467-93. 
Rutherford, T.F. and M. Babiker, 1997: Input-output and general equilibrium estimates of 
embodied carbon: A dataset and static framework for assessment. Economics 
Discussion Paper 97-02, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
Rutherford, T.F. and S. Paltsev, 2000: GTAP-Energy in GAMS: The dataset and static 
model. Economics Discussion Paper 00-02, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
U.S. Congress, 2009: The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) 
U.S. House of Representative, Washington, DC. 
Winchester, N., S. Paltsev and J.M. Reilly, 2011: Will border carbon adjustments work? 
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 11(1) (Topics): Article 7. 
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
1. Uncertainty in Climate Change Policy Analysis  
Jacoby & Prinn December 1994 
2. Description and Validation of the MIT Version of the 
GISS 2D Model Sokolov & Stone June 1995 
3. Responses of Primary Production and Carbon Storage 
to Changes in Climate and Atmospheric CO2 
Concentration Xiao et al. October 1995 
4. Application of the Probabilistic Collocation Method 
for an Uncertainty Analysis Webster et al. January 1996 
5. World Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions:  
1950-2050 Schmalensee et al. April 1996 
6. The MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) Model Yang et al. May 1996 (superseded by No. 125) 
7. Integrated Global System Model for Climate Policy 
Analysis Prinn et al. June 1996 (superseded by No. 124) 
8. Relative Roles of Changes in CO2 and Climate to 
Equilibrium Responses of Net Primary Production and 
Carbon Storage Xiao et al. June 1996 
9. CO2 Emissions Limits: Economic Adjustments and the 
Distribution of Burdens Jacoby et al. July 1997 
10. Modeling the Emissions of N2O and CH4 from the 
Terrestrial Biosphere to the Atmosphere Liu Aug. 1996 
11. Global Warming Projections: Sensitivity to Deep Ocean 
Mixing Sokolov & Stone September 1996 
12. Net Primary Production of Ecosystems in China and 
its Equilibrium Responses to Climate Changes  
Xiao et al. November 1996 
13. Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions 
Schmalensee November 1996 
14. What Does Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas 
Concentrations Mean? Jacoby et al. November 1996 
15. Economic Assessment of CO2 Capture and Disposal 
Eckaus et al. December 1996 
16. What Drives Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon? 
Pfaff December 1996 
17. A Flexible Climate Model For Use In Integrated 
Assessments Sokolov & Stone March 1997 
18. Transient Climate Change and Potential Croplands of 
the World in the 21st Century Xiao et al. May 1997 
19. Joint Implementation: Lessons from Title IV’s Voluntary 
Compliance Programs Atkeson June 1997 
20. Parameterization of Urban Subgrid Scale Processes 
in Global Atm. Chemistry Models Calbo et al. July 1997 
21. Needed: A Realistic Strategy for Global Warming 
Jacoby, Prinn & Schmalensee August 1997 
22. Same Science, Differing Policies; The Saga of Global 
Climate Change Skolnikoff August 1997 
23. Uncertainty in the Oceanic Heat and Carbon Uptake 
and their Impact on Climate Projections  
Sokolov et al. September 1997 
24. A Global Interactive Chemistry and Climate Model 
Wang, Prinn & Sokolov September 1997 
25. Interactions Among Emissions, Atmospheric 
Chemistry & Climate Change Wang & Prinn Sept. 1997 
26. Necessary Conditions for Stabilization Agreements 
Yang & Jacoby October 1997 
27. Annex I Differentiation Proposals: Implications for 
Welfare, Equity and Policy Reiner & Jacoby Oct. 1997 
28. Transient Climate Change and Net Ecosystem 
Production of the Terrestrial Biosphere  
Xiao et al. November 1997 
29. Analysis of CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel in Korea: 
1961–1994 Choi November 1997 
30. Uncertainty in Future Carbon Emissions: A Preliminary 
Exploration Webster November 1997 
31. Beyond Emissions Paths: Rethinking the Climate Impacts 
of Emissions Protocols Webster & Reiner November 1997 
32. Kyoto’s Unfinished Business Jacoby et al. June 1998 
33. Economic Development and the Structure of the 
Demand for Commercial Energy Judson et al. April 1998 
34. Combined Effects of Anthropogenic Emissions and 
Resultant Climatic Changes on Atmospheric OH 
Wang & Prinn April 1998 
35. Impact of Emissions, Chemistry, and Climate on 
Atmospheric Carbon Monoxide Wang & Prinn April 1998 
36. Integrated Global System Model for Climate Policy 
Assessment: Feedbacks and Sensitivity Studies  
Prinn et al. June 1998 
37. Quantifying the Uncertainty in Climate Predictions 
Webster & Sokolov July 1998 
38. Sequential Climate Decisions Under Uncertainty: An 
Integrated Framework Valverde et al. September 1998 
39. Uncertainty in Atmospheric CO2 (Ocean Carbon Cycle 
Model Analysis) Holian Oct. 1998 (superseded by No. 80) 
40. Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using 
Marginal Abatement Curves Ellerman & Decaux Oct. 
1998 
41. The Effects on Developing Countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol and CO2 Emissions Trading  
Ellerman et al. November 1998 
42. Obstacles to Global CO2 Trading: A Familiar Problem 
Ellerman November 1998 
43. The Uses and Misuses of Technology Development as 
a Component of Climate Policy Jacoby November 
1998 
44. Primary Aluminum Production: Climate Policy, 
Emissions and Costs Harnisch et al. December 1998 
45. Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol  
Reilly et al. January 1999 
46. From Science to Policy: The Science-Related Politics of 
Climate Change Policy in the U.S. Skolnikoff January 1999 
47. Constraining Uncertainties in Climate Models Using 
Climate Change Detection Techniques  
Forest et al. April 1999 
48. Adjusting to Policy Expectations in Climate Change 
Modeling Shackley et al. May 1999 
49. Toward a Useful Architecture for Climate Change 
Negotiations Jacoby et al. May 1999 
50. A Study of the Effects of Natural Fertility, Weather 
and Productive Inputs in Chinese Agriculture  
Eckaus & Tso July 1999 
51. Japanese Nuclear Power and the Kyoto Agreement 
Babiker, Reilly & Ellerman August 1999 
52. Interactive Chemistry and Climate Models in Global 
Change Studies Wang & Prinn September 1999 
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
53. Developing Country Effects of Kyoto-Type Emissions 
Restrictions Babiker & Jacoby October 1999 
54. Model Estimates of the Mass Balance of the 
Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets Bugnion Oct 1999 
55. Changes in Sea-Level Associated with Modifications 
of Ice Sheets over 21st Century Bugnion October 1999 
56. The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries  
Babiker et al. October 1999 
57. Can EPA Regulate Greenhouse Gases Before the 
Senate Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol?  
Bugnion & Reiner November 1999 
58. Multiple Gas Control Under the Kyoto Agreement 
Reilly, Mayer & Harnisch March 2000 
59. Supplementarity: An Invitation for Monopsony? 
Ellerman & Sue Wing April 2000 
60. A Coupled Atmosphere-Ocean Model of Intermediate 
Complexity Kamenkovich et al. May 2000  
61. Effects of Differentiating Climate Policy by Sector: 
A U.S. Example Babiker et al. May 2000  
62. Constraining Climate Model Properties Using 
Optimal Fingerprint Detection Methods Forest et al. 
May 2000  
63. Linking Local Air Pollution to Global Chemistry and 
Climate Mayer et al. June 2000  
64. The Effects of Changing Consumption Patterns on the 
Costs of Emission Restrictions Lahiri et al. Aug 2000 
65. Rethinking the Kyoto Emissions Targets  
Babiker & Eckaus August 2000 
66. Fair Trade and Harmonization of Climate Change 
Policies in Europe Viguier September 2000 
67. The Curious Role of “Learning” in Climate Policy: 
Should We Wait for More Data? Webster October 2000 
68. How to Think About Human Influence on Climate 
Forest, Stone & Jacoby October 2000 
69. Tradable Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions:  
A primer with reference to Europe Ellerman Nov 2000 
70. Carbon Emissions and The Kyoto Commitment in the 
European Union Viguier et al. February 2001 
71. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
Model: Revisions, Sensitivities and Results  
Babiker et al. February 2001 (superseded by No. 125) 
72. Cap and Trade Policies in the Presence of Monopoly 
and Distortionary Taxation Fullerton & Metcalf March ‘01 
73. Uncertainty Analysis of Global Climate Change 
Projections Webster et al. Mar. ‘01 (superseded by No. 95) 
74. The Welfare Costs of Hybrid Carbon Policies in the 
European Union Babiker et al. June 2001 
75. Feedbacks Affecting the Response of the 
Thermohaline Circulation to Increasing CO2 
Kamenkovich et al. July 2001 
76. CO2 Abatement by Multi-fueled Electric Utilities:  
An Analysis Based on Japanese Data  
Ellerman & Tsukada July 2001 
77. Comparing Greenhouse Gases Reilly et al. July 2001 
78. Quantifying Uncertainties in Climate System 
Properties using Recent Climate Observations  
Forest et al. July 2001  
79. Uncertainty in Emissions Projections for Climate 
Models Webster et al. August 2001 
80. Uncertainty in Atmospheric CO2 Predictions from a 
Global Ocean Carbon Cycle Model  
Holian et al. September 2001 
81. A Comparison of the Behavior of AO GCMs in 
Transient Climate Change Experiments  
Sokolov et al. December 2001 
82. The Evolution of a Climate Regime: Kyoto to 
Marrakech Babiker, Jacoby & Reiner February 2002 
83. The “Safety Valve” and Climate Policy  
Jacoby & Ellerman February 2002 
84. A Modeling Study on the Climate Impacts of Black 
Carbon Aerosols Wang March 2002 
85. Tax Distortions and Global Climate Policy  
Babiker et al. May 2002 
86. Incentive-based Approaches for Mitigating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Issues and Prospects for 
India Gupta June 2002 
87. Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake in an Ocean GCM with 
Idealized Geometry Huang, Stone & Hill  
September 2002 
88. The Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake in Transient Climate 
Change Huang et al. September 2002 
89. Representing Energy Technologies in Top-down 
Economic Models using Bottom-up Information  
McFarland et al. October 2002 
90. Ozone Effects on Net Primary Production and Carbon 
Sequestration in the U.S. Using a Biogeochemistry 
Model Felzer et al. November 2002 
91. Exclusionary Manipulation of Carbon Permit 
Markets: A Laboratory Test Carlén November 2002 
92. An Issue of Permanence: Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Temporary Carbon Storage Herzog et al. December 
2002 
93. Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial? 
Babiker et al. December 2002 
94. Modeling Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Hyman et al. December 2002 
95. Uncertainty Analysis of Climate Change and Policy 
Response Webster et al. December 2002 
96. Market Power in International Carbon Emissions 
Trading: A Laboratory Test Carlén January 2003 
97. Emissions Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in the United States: The McCain-Lieberman 
Proposal Paltsev et al. June 2003 
98. Russia’s Role in the Kyoto Protocol Bernard et al. Jun ‘03 
99. Thermohaline Circulation Stability: A Box Model Study 
Lucarini & Stone June 2003 
100. Absolute vs. Intensity-Based Emissions Caps 
Ellerman & Sue Wing July 2003 
101. Technology Detail in a Multi-Sector CGE Model: 
Transport Under Climate Policy Schafer & Jacoby July 2003 
102. Induced Technical Change and the Cost of Climate 
Policy Sue Wing September 2003 
103. Past and Future Effects of Ozone on Net Primary 
Production and Carbon Sequestration Using a Global 
Biogeochemical Model Felzer et al. (revised) January 2004 
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
104. A Modeling Analysis of Methane Exchanges 
Between Alaskan Ecosystems and the Atmosphere 
Zhuang et al. November 2003 
105. Analysis of Strategies of Companies under Carbon 
Constraint Hashimoto January 2004 
106. Climate Prediction: The Limits of Ocean Models  
Stone February 2004 
107. Informing Climate Policy Given Incommensurable 
Benefits Estimates Jacoby February 2004 
108. Methane Fluxes Between Terrestrial Ecosystems 
and the Atmosphere at High Latitudes During the 
Past Century Zhuang et al. March 2004 
109. Sensitivity of Climate to Diapycnal Diffusivity in the 
Ocean Dalan et al. May 2004 
110. Stabilization and Global Climate Policy  
Sarofim et al. July 2004 
111. Technology and Technical Change in the MIT EPPA 
Model Jacoby et al. July 2004 
112. The Cost of Kyoto Protocol Targets: The Case of 
Japan Paltsev et al. July 2004 
113. Economic Benefits of Air Pollution Regulation in the 
USA: An Integrated Approach Yang et al. (revised) Jan. 2005 
114. The Role of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases in Climate 
Policy: Analysis Using the MIT IGSM Reilly et al. Aug. ‘04 
115. Future U.S. Energy Security Concerns Deutch Sep. ‘04 
116. Explaining Long-Run Changes in the Energy 
Intensity of the U.S. Economy Sue Wing Sept. 2004 
117. Modeling the Transport Sector: The Role of Existing 
Fuel Taxes in Climate Policy Paltsev et al. November 
2004 
118. Effects of Air Pollution Control on Climate  
Prinn et al. January 2005 
119. Does Model Sensitivity to Changes in CO2 Provide a 
Measure of Sensitivity to the Forcing of Different 
Nature? Sokolov March 2005 
120. What Should the Government Do To Encourage 
Technical Change in the Energy Sector? Deutch May ‘05 
121. Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in 
Japan Kasahara et al. May 2005 
122. A 3D Ocean-Seaice-Carbon Cycle Model and its 
Coupling to a 2D Atmospheric Model: Uses in Climate 
Change Studies Dutkiewicz et al. (revised) November 2005 
123. Simulating the Spatial Distribution of Population 
and Emissions to 2100 Asadoorian May 2005 
124. MIT Integrated Global System Model (IGSM)  
Version 2: Model Description and Baseline Evaluation 
Sokolov et al. July 2005 
125. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) Model: Version 4 Paltsev et al. August 2005 
126. Estimated PDFs of Climate System Properties 
Including Natural and Anthropogenic Forcings  
Forest et al. September 2005 
127. An Analysis of the European Emission Trading 
Scheme Reilly & Paltsev October 2005 
128. Evaluating the Use of Ocean Models of Different 
Complexity in Climate Change Studies  
Sokolov et al. November 2005 
129. Future Carbon Regulations and Current Investments 
in Alternative Coal-Fired Power Plant Designs  
Sekar et al. December 2005 
130. Absolute vs. Intensity Limits for CO2 Emission 
Control: Performance Under Uncertainty  
Sue Wing et al. January 2006 
131. The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence 
from Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in 
Weather Deschenes & Greenstone January 2006 
132. The Value of Emissions Trading Webster et al. Feb. 2006 
133. Estimating Probability Distributions from Complex 
Models with Bifurcations: The Case of Ocean 
Circulation Collapse Webster et al. March 2006 
134. Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy  
Otto et al. April 2006 
135. Modeling Climate Feedbacks to Energy Demand: 
The Case of China Asadoorian et al. June 2006 
136. Bringing Transportation into a Cap-and-Trade 
Regime  Ellerman, Jacoby & Zimmerman June 2006 
137. Unemployment Effects of Climate Policy Babiker & 
Eckaus July 2006 
138. Energy Conservation in the United States: 
Understanding its Role in Climate Policy Metcalf Aug. ‘06 
139. Directed Technical Change and the Adoption of CO2 
Abatement Technology: The Case of CO2 Capture and 
Storage Otto & Reilly August 2006 
140. The Allocation of European Union Allowances: 
Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles  
Buchner  et al. October 2006 
141. Over-Allocation or Abatement? A preliminary 
analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2006 emissions 
data 
Ellerman & Buchner December 2006 
142. Federal Tax Policy Towards Energy Metcalf Jan. 2007 
143. Technical Change, Investment and Energy Intensity 
Kratena March 2007 
144. Heavier Crude, Changing Demand for Petroleum 
Fuels, Regional Climate Policy, and the Location of 
Upgrading Capacity Reilly et al. April 2007 
145. Biomass Energy and Competition for Land  
Reilly & Paltsev April 2007 
146. Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals  
Paltsev et al. April 2007 
147. A Global Land System Framework for Integrated 
Climate-Change Assessments Schlosser et al. May 2007 
148. Relative Roles of Climate Sensitivity and Forcing in 
Defining the Ocean Circulation Response to Climate 
Change Scott et al. May 2007 
149. Global Economic Effects of Changes in Crops, 
Pasture, and Forests due to Changing Climate, CO2 
and Ozone Reilly et al. May 2007 
150. U.S. GHG Cap-and-Trade Proposals: Application of a 
Forward-Looking Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Gurgel et al. June  2007 
151. Consequences of Considering Carbon/Nitrogen 
Interactions on the Feedbacks between Climate and 
the Terrestrial Carbon Cycle Sokolov et al. June  2007 
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
152. Energy Scenarios for East Asia: 2005-2025 Paltsev & 
Reilly July 2007 
153. Climate Change, Mortality, and Adaptation: 
Evidence from Annual Fluctuations in Weather in the U.S. 
Deschênes & Greenstone August 2007 
154. Modeling the Prospects for Hydrogen Powered 
Transportation Through 2100 Sandoval et al. 
  February 2008 
155. Potential Land Use Implications of a Global Biofuels 
Industry Gurgel et al.  March 2008 
156. Estimating the Economic Cost of Sea-Level Rise 
 Sugiyama et al.  April 2008 
157. Constraining Climate Model Parameters from 
Observed 20th Century Changes Forest et al. April 2008 
158. Analysis of the Coal Sector under Carbon 
Constraints McFarland et al. April 2008 
159. Impact of Sulfur and Carbonaceous Emissions from 
International Shipping on Aerosol Distributions and 
Direct Radiative Forcing Wang & Kim April 2008 
160. Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals 
Metcalf et al.  April 2008 
161. A Forward Looking Version of the MIT Emissions 
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model 
 Babiker et al. May 2008 
162. The European Carbon Market in Action:  Lessons   
from the first trading period  Interim Report 
 Convery, Ellerman, & de Perthuis June 2008 
163. The Influence on Climate Change of Differing 
Scenarios for Future Development Analyzed Using 
the MIT Integrated Global System Model Prinn et al. 
September 2008 
164. Marginal Abatement Costs and Marginal Welfare 
Costs for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: 
Results from the EPPA Model Holak et al. November 
2008 
165. Uncertainty in Greenhouse Emissions and Costs of 
Atmospheric Stabilization Webster et al. November 
2008 
166. Sensitivity of Climate Change Projections to 
Uncertainties in the Estimates of Observed Changes 
in Deep-Ocean Heat Content Sokolov et al. November 
2008 
167. Sharing the Burden of GHG Reductions Jacoby et al. 
November 2008 
168. Unintended Environmental Consequences of a 
Global Biofuels Program Melillo et al. January 2009 
169. Probabilistic Forecast for 21st Century Climate 
Based on Uncertainties in Emissions (without Policy) 
and Climate Parameters Sokolov et al. January 2009 
170. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme: A Proto-type 
Global System? Ellerman February 2009 
171. Designing a U.S. Market for CO2 Parsons et al. 
February 2009 
172. Prospects for Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles in the 
United States & Japan:  A General Equilibrium Analysis 
Karplus et al. April 2009 
173. The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States 
Paltsev et al. April 2009 
174. A Semi-Empirical Representation of the Temporal 
Variation of Total Greenhouse Gas Levels Expressed 
as Equivalent Levels of Carbon Dioxide Huang et al. 
June 2009 
175. Potential Climatic Impacts and Reliability of Very 
Large Scale Wind Farms Wang & Prinn June 2009 
176. Biofuels, Climate Policy and the European Vehicle 
Fleet Gitiaux et al.  August 2009 
177. Global Health and Economic Impacts of Future 
Ozone Pollution Selin et al.  August 2009 
178. Measuring Welfare Loss Caused by Air Pollution in 
Europe: A CGE Analysis Nam et al.  August 2009 
179. Assessing Evapotranspiration Estimates from the 
Global Soil Wetness Project Phase 2 (GSWP-2) 
Simulations Schlosser and Gao September 2009 
180. Analysis of Climate Policy Targets under 
Uncertainty Webster et al.  September 2009 
181. Development of a Fast and Detailed Model of 
Urban-Scale Chemical and Physical Processing Cohen 
& Prinn  October 2009 
182. Distributional Impacts of a U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Carbon Pricing 
Rausch et al.  November 2009 
183. Canada’s Bitumen Industry Under CO2 Constraints 
Chan et al.  January 2010 
184. Will Border Carbon Adjustments Work? Winchester et 
al.  February 2010 
185. Distributional Implications of Alternative U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Control Measures Rausch et al.  June 
2010 
186. The Future of U.S. Natural Gas Production, Use, and 
Trade Paltsev et al.  June 2010 
187. Combining a Renewable Portfolio Standard with a 
Cap-and-Trade Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
Morris et al.  July 2010 
188. On the Correlation between Forcing and Climate 
Sensitivity Sokolov August 2010 
189. Modeling the Global Water Resource System in an 
Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework: IGSM-
WRS Strzepek et al. September 2010 
190. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Zonal-Mean Flow Monier and Weare 
January 2011 
191. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Ozone Transport Monier and Weare 
January 2011 
192. The Impact of Border Carbon Adjustments under 
Alternative Producer Responses Winchester February 
2011
